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Theoretical comparisons of the welfare consequences of tariﬀs, subsidies and im-
port licenses have relied on the assumption that ﬁrms reap no private beneﬁts from the
imposition of a tariﬀ. This paper conducts an empirical analysis of whether a recent
change in U.S. antidumping law known as the Byrd Amendment bestows private ben-
eﬁts to ﬁrms lobbying for tariﬀ protection and, thus, increases the level of rent-seeking
in the United States. The results provide strong evidence that industries have chosen
to lobby for more tariﬀ protection, or ﬁled more antidumping petitions, since passage
of the Byrd Amendment. However, there is less evidence that the number of ﬁrms ﬁling
these petitions increased under the law. This suggests that the Byrd Amendment only
partially alleviates the incentive to free-ride.
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11 Introduction
Comparisons of the welfare consequences of tariﬀs, import licenses and subsidies are
based on the assumption that while ﬁrms reap private beneﬁts from the award of an import
license or production subsidy, all ﬁrms within an industry beneﬁt from the imposition of a
tariﬀ. Tariﬀs are, in a sense, a public good. Because of the free rider problem associated
with public goods, the level of rent-seeking in a society will be higher when the government
uses production subsidies or import licenses than when it uses tariﬀs as a policy tool.1
Although the theoretical underpinnings of this analysis is sound, the results may prove to
be irrelevant if ﬁrms can reap private beneﬁts from the imposition of a tariﬀ. This paper
conducts an empirical analysis of whether a new law provides private beneﬁts to ﬁrms seeking
the imposition of tariﬀs and, thus, increases the level of rent-seeking and trade protection in
the United States.
In the fall of 2000 Congress passed the “Continued Dumping and Subsidy Oﬀset Act,”
more commonly known as the Byrd Amendment. Under this law, ﬁrms that actively support
successful antidumping petitions can be awarded with a portion of the tariﬀ revenue that
results from the petition.2 I argue that the Byrd Amendment essentially provides private
beneﬁts to ﬁrms ﬁling antidumping petitions. Therefore, more ﬁrms will engage in rent-
seeking under the law and the number of ﬁrms ﬁling petitions will increase.
Previous studies have found that increasing the private beneﬁts of participating in an-
tidumping petitions will theoretically increase the level of trade protection in an economy.
For example, using simulations of a model of ﬁrm participation in antidumping petitions,
Olson [2004] concludes that increasing the private beneﬁts to ﬁrms participating in successful
1For example, Rodrik [1986] ﬁnds that the welfare lost due to the imposition of tariﬀs may be less than
that lost due to the accordance of subsidies because ﬁrms will expend fewer resources lobbying for tariﬀs
due to the public goods problem.
2If an antidumping petition is successful, tariﬀs are imposed upon products from speciﬁc countries that
are found to be selling products in the United States at prices below the average cost of production or the
domestic price in the targeted country. Baldwin and Moore [1991], among others, provides a more thorough
description of U.S. Antidumping Law.
2antidumping petitions by 10 percent will increase the proportion of ﬁrms ﬁling antidumping
petitions nearly 4 percent and the number of petitions ﬁled by 9.3 percent. This research
expands upon Olson [2004] by speciﬁcally testing whether the Byrd Amendment has signif-
icantly increased the number of ﬁrms ﬁling antidumping petitions in the ﬁrst three years of
the law’s existence.
I decompose this general query into two separate but important issues: (1) has the Byrd
Amendment increased the number of petitions ﬁled by industries and (2) conditional on ﬁling
a petition, has the Byrd Amendment increased the number of ﬁrms actively participating
in these petitions. Using an econometric model that corrects for the inherent selection bias
problem, I ﬁnd strong evidence that industries have chosen to lobby for more tariﬀ protection,
or ﬁled more antidumping petitions, since the under the Byrd Amendment. However, there
is less evidence that the number of ﬁrms ﬁling these petitions increased under the law. This
suggests that the Byrd Amendment only partially alleviates the incentive to free-ride.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section I provide a brief description of
how the Byrd Amendment provides private beneﬁts to ﬁrms lobbying for tariﬀ protection.
Sections 3 and 4 discuss the data and econometric speciﬁcation respectively. Section 5
presents the results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Private Beneﬁts Under the Byrd Amendment
Intuitively, the Byrd Amendment induces ﬁrms to ﬁle antidumping petitions in two
important ways. First, by distributing the tariﬀ revenue from successful petitions to ﬁrms
within the industry, the law increases the total, industry-wide expected beneﬁts of ﬁling
a petition. It thereby increases the entire industry’s incentive to ﬁle a petition. Second,
and perhaps more importantly, because the Byrd Amendment only awards funds to ﬁrms
that actively support petitions, it provides private beneﬁts to ﬁrms that choose to ﬁle the
petition. Thus, the Byrd Amendment reduces the incentive of ﬁrms to free-ride oﬀ others in
the industry and diminishes this traditional barrier to lobbying for the imposition of tariﬀs.
3Speciﬁcally, the Byrd Amendment requires the Customs Service to dispense all tariﬀ
revenue collected due to a successful antidumping petition to only those ﬁrms that actively
supported the original petition.3 Anecdotes published in the popular press conﬁrm that the
law has given industries and individual ﬁrms more incentive to participate in antidumping
petitions. For example, the Chief Financial Oﬃcer of a Californian mushroom processor
noted that before the Byrd Amendment the company had not bothered to complain oﬃ-
cially about foreign competition. However, the cash incentive under the Byrd Amendment
“absolutely” made the company more likely to ﬁle a claim.4
It should be noted that ﬁrms do not necessarily have to actually ﬁle a petition in order
to be eligible for Byrd Funds. Any ﬁrm that indicated its support for the original petition in
the course of the government’s investigation is eligible. However, there is evidence that ﬁrms
may want to be included amongst those ﬁrms actually ﬁling the petition in order to ensure
their eligibility for these monetary beneﬁts. For example, the government recently rejected
a company’s request for Byrd Amendment funds, asserting that the company only oﬀered
conditional support for the tariﬀs in the original petition. Rulings such as this likely encour-
age ﬁrms to more actively support antidumping petitions. In another example, the Seafood
Trade Action Committee recruited ﬁrms to participate in an antidumping petition ﬁled in
2003, distributing ﬂiers which noted that “you must register to participate in any monetary
beneﬁts that may accrue through duties levied on imported shrimp if the domestic shrimp
industry prevails.” This active recruitment process led to a lawsuit when the Committee
opposed eﬀorts to expand the scope of the petition to include fresh shrimp, despite contribu-
tions by Louisiana shrimpers of nearly $50,000 to fund the petition. In the suit, shrimpers
demanded a portion of any monetary distribution received as a result of the antidumping
3Tariﬀ revenue is not divided equally among qualiﬁed ﬁrms. Firms instead apply for Byrd funds to
pay for “qualiﬁed” expenditures, which include such things as manufacturing facilities, equipment, research
and development, and personnel training. Customs reviews applications on an annual basis and distributes
available funds based on the strength of the applications.
4Jeﬀrey Sparshott, “Firms get $329 million to oﬀset foreign goods: 1,200 recipients of subsidy plan.” The
Washington Times. December 20, 2002.
4petition.
Not surprisingly, the law has proven to be extremely popular amongst U.S. producers.
Customs distributed $561.1 million to over 1,200 ﬁrms between 2001 and 2002. The value
of individual awards ranged from hundreds of dollars to more than $60 million. The law
has been strongly criticized by U.S. importers and exporters, as well as its leading trading
partners. For example, a group of U.S. importers claimed in February 2001 that the law
“creates a ﬁnancial incentive to support petitions [in order to collect] duties later, and could
work to increase the number of ...cases ﬁled.”5 European Union oﬃcials have stated that the
system “creates a perverse incentive system” to reward companies for bringing complaints.6
The World Trade Organization ruled in September 2002 that the Byrd Amendment vio-
lates the international agreement on subsidies and directed the United States to abolish
the law. There are currently two bills pending before Congress that would repeal the Byrd
Amendment, although it is unclear when action on these bills will be taken.
3 Data
I compiled data on 447 four-digit SIC87 manufacturing industries for the years 1979
through 1997 and 365 six-digit NAICS97 manufacturing industries for the years 1997 through
2002.7 The U.S. Bureau of the Census’ Annual Survey of Manufacturers, Survey of Plant
Capacity, and Economic Census provides data such as the capacity utilization rate and the
5“Importer Group Urges U.S. Congress to Repeal Byrd Amendment,” Dow Jones International News,
February 13, 2001.
6Elizabeth Olson, “U.S. Law on Trade Fines is Challenged Overseas,” The New York Times, July 14,
2001.
7In 1997, the U.S. Bureau of the Census drastically changed its industrial classiﬁcation system from
the Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) system to the North American Industrial Classiﬁcation System
(NAICS). Although concordances exist to convert NAICS97 data to SIC87 data, because I am not utilizing
the panel nature of this dataset changing industrial classiﬁcation schemes will not eﬀect these results.
5four-ﬁrm concentration ratio.8 I collected import and export data from the NBER’s U.S.
Import and Export Database and the International Trade Commission’s dataweb. Finally,
macroeconomic variables such as the annual unemployment and GNP growth rate were
gathered from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and Bureau of Economic Analysis.
I merged the resulting panel with antidumping petition information.9 The U.S. An-
tidumping Database includes information such as the date of initiation and the outcome of
petitions ﬁled between 1980 and 1994. I supplemented this database with the information
from Federal Register Notices associated with petitions ﬁled between 1995 and 2003. I col-
lected data on the proportion of ﬁrms ﬁling the antidumping petitions for the entire sample
period from Federal Register notices and International Trade Commission reports.
Between 1980 and 2003, U.S. manufacturing industries ﬁled a total of 1,033 antidumping
petitions. As can be seen from Figure [1], the number of petitions ﬁled in a single year
ranged from a low of 14 in 1995 to a high of 93 in 1992. Studies such as Takacs [1981] have
found clear evidence that the number of import-relief petitions ﬁled each year is negatively-
correlated with important macroeconomic variables such as GNP growth rate. The total
number of petitions ﬁled by a single industry in a single year ranged from 0 to 56 during
this time period.
The raw data provides no clear evidence that the Byrd Amendment has positively aﬀected
the number of petitions ﬁled during the sample period. In fact, the parameter estimates from
a Poisson regression of the total number of petitions ﬁled each year indicate that the Byrd
Amendment has actually reduced the number of petitions ﬁled, although this parameter
estimate is insigniﬁcant. The results from this regression are presented in Table [1].
8The Economic Census is released every ﬁve years (in 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997). Therefore, the
four-ﬁrm concentration ratio and total number of ﬁrms in the industry were imputed for non-Census years.
9The International Trade Commission and Department of Commerce use data from the “period of in-
vestigation” to determine the amount of protection to award to the ﬁrm. Because this period is typically
deﬁned as the six months prior to the initiation of the case, I merged petition information with economic
variables from the prior year. For example, the number of ﬁrms participating in a petition ﬁled in 1993 is
assumed to be a function of the value of imports in 1992.
6Table [2] shows the distribution of ﬁrms choosing to actively participate in antidumping
petitions over the sample period. The average proportion of ﬁrms participating in a single
antidumping petition increased from 40.4 percent between 1980 and 2000 to 46.3 percent
following passage of the Byrd Amendment, suggesting that the law does encourage more
ﬁrms within the industry to support an antidumping action.
4 Econometric Speciﬁcation
As noted in the Introduction, the goal of this research is to determine whether the Byrd
Amendment has signiﬁcantly increased the number of ﬁrms ﬁling antidumping petitions.
I decompose this general query into two separate but important issues: (1) has the Byrd
Amendment increased the number of petitions ﬁled by industries and (2) conditional on ﬁling
a petition, has the Byrd Amendment increased the number of ﬁrms actively participating in
these petitions.
In order to accurately estimate the eﬀect of the Byrd Amendment, one must correct for
the sample selection problem which plagues studies of this nature. Speciﬁcally, a positive
number of petitions is observed only if at least one ﬁrm in the industry chooses to actively
participate in the petition process. Firms within industries that choose to ﬁle antidumping
petitions may have common, unobserved characteristics which impact both the number of
petitions ﬁled as well as the proportion of ﬁrms ﬁling those petitions. Econometric speci-
ﬁcations that do not account for this sample selection bias result in inconsistent estimates.
The econometric model detailed below is similar to one developed in Terza [1998], who found
that a maximum likelihood approach is the most eﬃcient estimator for count data models
with sample selection.10
The number of petitions ﬁled by industry i in period t, yit, is a Poisson random variable
with parameter λit. Here, λit denotes the expected number of petitions ﬁled by industry
10See Greene [2000] for a description of the sample selection problem, and various methods to correct for
this problem in count data models.
7i in period t, which is a function of both observed industry characteristics represented by
xit and unobserved characteristics represented by the error it. Based on this speciﬁcation,
the distribution of the number of petitions ﬁled by industry i conditional on unobserved
characteristics is deﬁned as:
yit|it˜Poisson(λit)
lnλit|it = β
0xit + it (1)
where β includes parameters to be estimated. Observed industry characteristics include
variables that previous studies have found to be important determinants in the success of
antidumping petitions, including the value of imports and the growth in capacity utilization.
I also include macroeconomic variables in xit to capture the impact of business cycles on the
number of petitions ﬁled.
For each petition ﬁled, the proportion of ﬁrms in the industry choosing to participate in
petition p, Pitp is deﬁned as
Pitp = δ
0kit + νitp (2)
where kit includes observed industry characteristics such as the four-ﬁrm concentration ratio,
the error νitp captures unobserved factors which inﬂuence the proportion of ﬁrms participat-
ing in petition p, and δ includes parameters to be estimated.






















The same unobserved characteristics that induce an industry to ﬁle one or more petitions,
as captured in , will also eﬀect the proportion of ﬁrms participating in those petitions. The
covariance between ν and  captures this relationship.
Deﬁne y∗
it as a dummy variable that equals one if ﬁrms within the industry choose to ﬁle
at least one petition. Under a maximum likelihood approach, the likelihood contribution for
a single observation can take one of two forms. If no petitions are ﬁled, then the likelihood
8contribution is the probability that ﬁrms within the industry choose to ﬁle 0 petitions, or yit
equals zero.
If one or more petitions are ﬁled, then the likelihood contribution is the joint probability
of observing the number of petitions ﬁled and the proportion of ﬁrms participating in each
of those petitions. The probability of observing yit petitions ﬁled by industry i in period t





Using the bivariate normal distribution, the probability of observing Pitp ﬁrms participating
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where ρν is the coeﬃcient of correlation between  and ν and φ is the standard normal
distribution. Based on this speciﬁcation, the log likelihood contribution of industry i in
period t is










To complete the speciﬁcation, I integrate out the error  from the log-likelihood function.









There is no closed form solution to the integral in equation [7]. Therefore, I use the Hermite
quadrature method to maximize the log-likelihood function using an approximation.
5 Results
The parameters estimates from the maximum likelihood procedure are presented in
Table [3], where the standard errors are given in parentheses. As expected, I ﬁnd strong
9evidence that the Byrd Amendment increased the number of antidumping petitions ﬁled by
industries between 2001 and 2003. On average, the Byrd Amendment resulted in a 34.9
percent increase in the average number of petitions ﬁled by industries in a given year.
The evidence is not as strong that more ﬁrms within industries are choosing to actively
participate in those antidumping petitions actually ﬁled. The parameter estimate is positive,
suggesting that there has been an increase in the proportion of ﬁrms choosing to ﬁle petitions
under the Byrd Amendment, but it is insigniﬁcant. Recall that ﬁrms do not necessarily have
to ﬁle the petition in order to be eligible for Byrd funds, as long as they indicated their
strong support for the petition during the course of the investigation. As a result, it may
be the case that the Byrd Amendment does not totally eliminate the free-rider eﬀect, and
ﬁrms are continuing to rely on others in the industry to bear the ﬁnancial cost of ﬁling a
petition even though they can now enjoy the Byrd Amendment revenue associate with a
successful petition. This result suggests that the Byrd Amendment increases the number of
petitions ﬁled by increasing the entire industry’s expected beneﬁts from the petition, with
the alleviation of the free-rider problem associated with lobbying for tariﬀ protection only a
secondary eﬀect.
Most of the other parameter estimates are signiﬁcant and of the expected sign. For exam-
ple, like Takacs [1981] I ﬁnd that the number of antidumping petitions ﬁled by industries is
counter-cyclical; more petitions are ﬁled during periods characterized by high unemployment
rates.
The results indicate that the number of petitions ﬁled and the proportion of ﬁrms choosing
to ﬁle petitions increases as the capacity utilization growth rate falls. Capacity utilization is
one factor that the government uses to determine whether the domestic industry has been
injured by imports; industries with negative capacity utilization growth rates are more likely
to be awarded protection, thus more ﬁrms choose to engage in costly antidumping actions.
For similar reasons, both the expected number of petitions and the proportion of ﬁrms ﬁling
the petitions increases with the value of industry imports.
The conventional wisdom since Olson’s [1965] seminal work on collective actions has
10been that the free-rider problem becomes more severe as the number of the ﬁrms in the
industry rises. The parameter estimates are consistent with this theory, as I ﬁnd that more
concentrated industries are more easily able to overcome the free-rider problem to ﬁle more
petitions.
6 Conclusion
This paper argues that a recent change in U.S. antidumping law known as the Byrd
Amendment essentially provides private beneﬁts to ﬁrms that successfully lobby for tariﬀ
protection, thus alleviating the free-rider problem that has traditionally been thought to
hamper such rent-seeking. Empirical results conﬁrm that more petitions have been ﬁled
by industries since the implementation of the Byrd Amendment; the average number of
petitions ﬁled by industries in a given year increased 34.9 percent after passage of the law.
However, there is less evidence that the proportion of ﬁrms choosing to ﬁle these petitions
increased under the law. This suggests that the Byrd Amendment increases the number
of petitions ﬁled by increasing the entire industry’s expected beneﬁts from antidumping
petitions, with the alleviation of the free-rider problem associated with lobbying for tariﬀ
protection only a secondary eﬀect. This is no doubt due to the law’s stipulation that ﬁrms
do not have to actually ﬁle the petition in order to be awarded revenue under the Byrd
Amendment as long as they indicate strong support for the petition during the course of the
investigation. Therefore, the incentive to free-ride is only partially alleviated under the law.
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12Figure 1: Number of Antidumping Petitions Filed by Manufacturing Industries, 1980-2003
13Table 1
Poisson Regression Estimates: Number of Antidumping Petitions Filed Per Year
Intercept 1.858
(2.323)
Capacity Utilization Rate -0.005
(0.023)






Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate those parameters signiﬁcant at the 5
percent signiﬁcance level.
14Table 2
Proportion of Firms Filing Antidumping Petitions
Share of Petitions Filed Share of Petitions Filed
Between 1980-2000 Between 2001-2003
0.00< Proportion ≤0.25 36.7 17.0
0.25< Proportion ≤0.50 35.7 51.9
0.50< Proportion ≤0.75 12.3 18.5
0.75< Proportion ≤1.00 15.6 12.6
15Table 3
Maximum Likelihoood Estimates: The Eﬀect of the Byrd Amendment
On Proportion
On Number of of Firms
Petitions Filed Filing Petitions
(yit) (Pitp)
Mean of Error -9.468* 0.587*
(0.218) (0.049)
Imports (billions of dollars) 0.128* 0.002*
(0.005) (0.001)
Growth in imports -0.305* 0.002
(0.069) (0.016)
Unemployment rate 23.472* -0.912*
(1.672) (0.399)
Growth in capacity utilization -1.436* -0.061
(0.191) (0.045)
Four-ﬁrm concentration ratio 10.839* -0.326*
(0.732) (0.033)
Concentration Ratio Squared -13.936*
(0.857)
Byrd Amendment 0.353* 0.035
(0.103) (0.025)
Standard Deviation of  (σ) 1.145*
(0.019)
Standard Deviation of ν (σν) -1.253*
(0.018)
Correlation between  and ν (ρν) -0.036
(0.050)
Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate those parameters signiﬁcant at the 5
percent signiﬁcance level.